September 7, 2017
MY CORNER by Boyd Cathey
Korea: American Policy, China, and the Future
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Friends,
Much
of our nation’s recent attention internationally has been turned to North Korea
and the seemingly erratic actions of its leader, Kim Jong Un. It seems at the beginning of every American
presidency that Communist state engages in “testing” the resolve and policies
of the United States. It has been no different with the administration of
President Trump—with one major exception: this president does not come from the
same “foggy bottom” diplomatic and internationalist environment, or from the
usual political circles that have directed our foreign policy for decades. And
he does not appear willing to, as it were, “kick the can down the road,” to put
off dealing with the question of the North Korean nuclear threat to some later
time.
Add
to that the fact that Kim is now in the process of perfecting—and probably
already has—the ICBM capacity to transport hydrogen payloads to possibly as far
as Seattle, Los Angeles, or even Chicago. In other words, nuclear conflict has
become a real concern in Washington.
But
what seems to cast an even greater shadow over our relations with Pyongyang is
Kim himself and the kind of regime he leads. As supreme head of the “hermit
kingdom,” isolated, insular, and hostile, he rules a nation that has
demonstrated even less restraint than the world’s other so-called “rogue
regime,” Iran. At least the Mullahs in Iran seem to understand that open
conflict—war—with the United States, would be suicidal for their nation. As a
nation, they are involved heavily in Iraq, in Syria, and in Lebanon, and, yes,
there are the rather consistent verbal and media attacks on “the great Satan”
and the appeals to Islamic (Sh’ia) solidarity. Yet, they have also been careful
in many ways—save for a few confrontations in the Persian Gulf—not to directly
threaten to inflict a “nuclear holocaust” on the US or on American allies like
the Saudis.
Certainly,
goes the reasoning, Kim must understand that a direct military conflict with
the United States would mean the total obliteration of both his regime and his
country. And, no doubt, on those cold nights secreted in his mausoleum-style
bunkers across the country, he must realize that. But, as his father before
him, Kim Jong Un dances a kind of nuclear kabuki dance on a tight wire. It
seems clear that what he desires most of all is the kind of respect and
acceptance that the world’s other states enjoy, and his nuclear status gives
him that Ace card, and in fact it is the only real card he has to play—it
demands attention from the rest of the world. And the more he emits those blood
curdling threats of nuking Guam or ravaging the American west coast, the more
attention he receives.
The
Trump administration, from the beginning, understood that the way to affect Kim
and North Korea was largely through China. That nation is by far the North’s
largest trading partner and, indeed, the real regime prop that guarantees its
survival. While Communist China deeply fears the eventual collapse of the
Pyongyang regime—and a resultant human disaster with potentially millions of
Korean refugees traversing the border into Manchuria, and thus desires above
all a kind of status quo and lessening of tensions—it also recognizes that Kim’s
bellicose threats and imprecations, his continued testing of ICBMs potentially
capable of conveying atomic destruction across the Pacific, could easily reach
the “Sarajevo Point,” where one misstep or one action would mean devastating
war and possibly millions dead in the Korean peninsula.
A
major question for the United States, then, is to what degree and how are
we—should we be—as a nation involved? What kind of response is in our best
national interest? Are we dealing with a maniac who just happens to have a
nuclear capacity, or rather with a high stakes, reckless gambler who is willing
“to bet the farm” to achieve his longer range objective of respect and
acceptance into the “comity of nations”?
It
has been sixty-four years since the truce ending the Korean War. Some 28,000
American troops still remain in the South. Since 1953 South Korea has become
one of the most prosperous and successful states in Asia. Yet, it spends less
than 3% of its GNP on defense, while North Korea spends over one fourth of its
budget on military expense. Both South
Korea and Japan since the conclusion of the Second World War have made incredible
strides economically and politically, yet the United States still provides the
military “shield and buckler”—the defensive umbrella—for both states, a policy
which dates from the Cold War, when serious threats from Peking and the Soviet
Union were real and present.
But
that situation has changed dramatically in recent years. Both countries are
quite able of assuming a much larger role in their own defense, and certainly,
as some observers have noted, such a strategy would actually do two significant
things: first, it would shift much of the responsibility of defense to those
countries and away from the United States. Indeed, both Japan and South Korea
are quite capable of shouldering a major portion of that burden, including the
possibility of stationing nuclear missiles in those countries.
Secondly,
enhanced power and roles for Japan and Korea would place pressure on the
Chinese whose goal all along has been to
erect a kind of “Sino-Sphere of
Influence” in East Asia, both
economically but even more importantly,
politically (consider its recent “island building” in the South China Sea). The
relative power of a strong Japan and South Korea might well be the factors that
determine just how much pressure Peking put on Kim, or, even, at some future date, if it were to
see the need for some kind of regime change.
Strengthening
Japan and South Korea, then, while at the same time perhaps ratcheting down
direct American responsibility for the overall defense of the region, might be
an effective strategy of triangulation. After all, it seems that other avenues
have led nowhere. Indeed, Vladimir Putin’s recent statement that sanctions
implemented by the US will undoubtedly fail is probably quite realistic. If we
want a change—even a minor shift in the North’s actions—then it is most likely
through a combination of effective pressure on China, and at the same time,
ramping up the military capacities of our two major allies in the region.
No
doubt, should hostilities break out, we would be eventually dragged in. Yet,
there is no reason, six decades after Panmunjom, that we should continue to
place 28,000 American boys eye ball to eye ball with Kim’s troops on the DMZ.
Well-trained and committed South Koreans could fill that role, with Japanese
back up. And behind them, the might of the United States.
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